US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
11-1-2015

From Assistance to Partnership: Morocco and its Foreign Policy in
West Africa
Mohammed El-Katiri Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
El-Katiri, Mohammed Dr., "From Assistance to Partnership: Morocco and its Foreign Policy in West Africa"
(2015). Monographs, Books, and Publications. 436.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/436

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes
to the education of world class senior leaders,
develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions
to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor soldiers—past and present.

i

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct
strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
iii

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press

FROM ASSISTANCE TO PARTNERSHIP:
MOROCCO AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY
IN WEST AFRICA

Mohammed El-Katiri

November 2015
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

v

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War
College External Research Associates Program. Information on
this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudies
Institute.army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may
also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing
an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted
or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate
credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-711-1

vi

FOREWORD
Morocco is seeking to position itself as a regional
security provider in West Africa. Over recent years,
Morocco has emerged as a key partner for the development of variety of sectors in different West African
countries, but it also aspires to contribute to peace and
stability of this African sub-region that continues to
face important challenges and significant threats. In
particular, a range of initiatives is under way to combat religious extremism, terrorism, and transnational
organized crime including illicit drug trafficking,
which remains a major threat to peace and security in
the region.
At a time of deepening budget constraints, bilateral
cooperation with reliable and moderate regional partners offers a potential means of reducing costs while
still maintaining regional reach in order to pursue U.S.
security objectives. Morocco’s new efforts and initiative offer synergies with U.S. priorities for the region.
Morocco, with its geographic location, political stability, and close cultural ties with Sub-Saharan Africa,
offers itself as a potential partner to the U.S. defense
community to maintain U.S. influence in the region
and address shared security concerns.
In this monograph, Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri focuses on the geopolitical, security, and economic drivers of the renewed Moroccan interest in Sub-Saharan
Africa. He highlights Morocco’s contribution to counterextremism in West Africa and the Sahel region
through initiatives promoting moderate Islam, and
concludes with a number of recommendations on
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how Morocco could be supported by the United States
in tackling some key common challenges arising from
these sub-regions of Africa.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Moroccan foreign policy is currently emphasizing
its presence and relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and
in particular West Africa. The wide range of cooperative projects undertaken in recent years extends to
security relations, with Morocco seeking to position
itself as a regional security provider.
Morocco’s renewed interest in sub-Saharan Africa
is driven to a large extent by the remarkable economic
performance of a variety of African economies over
the last decade, and the potential for continued growth
over coming decades. Several African countries have
been seeing much greater—and increasing—economic activity, particularly those rich in natural resources
such as, but not limited to, copper, gold, oil, and gas.
But shared security has also emerged as an important aspect of Morocco’s relations with a range of Sahel
and West African countries. Moroccan decisionmakers see that peace and stability in the Sahel is not only
a basic requirement for their own economic development but, thanks to shared security concerns, is also of
prime importance to the stability of Morocco. Over the
last decade, Morocco has showed intense interest in
supporting peace and security in the region, through
regional and broader multilateral forums such as the
United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union.
Morocco is leveraging a range of factors—including historic ties, domestic political stability, unique
economic and institutional development experience,
its strategically important geographic location, and relations with Western countries—to strengthen its position in West Africa. Morocco also aspires to position
itself as a partner of choice for the United States and
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other organizations seeking to develop their interests
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This therefore provides opportunities for the United States to leverage common
interests in security and stability in the region.
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FROM ASSISTANCE TO PARTNERSHIP:
MOROCCO AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY
IN WEST AFRICA
Mohammed El-Katiri
Introduction.
Morocco has been deepening and accelerating its
engagement with Western African countries since the
ascendance to the throne of the current King, Mohammed VI, in July 1999. This is evidenced by the numerous visits paid by the Moroccan King to a variety of
West and Central African countries since 2000, and
the number of commercial and cooperation agreements signed over the last decade. Some of the Moroccan monarch’s tours lasted for weeks, signaling not
only the importance that the Moroccan state gives to
sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular, the West Africa
region, but also indicating the King’s personal fondness for these African countries.
The desire to diversify economic partners remains
Morocco’s main driver for strengthening and expanding its ties with West African countries. The strong
economic growth achieved over the last 2 decades in a
number of these states has drawn the attention of Morocco’s political and economic elites to the region. Several Western African countries, such as Cote d’Ivoire,
Guinea-Conakry, Sierra Leone, and Equatorial Guinea, have rich endowments of mineral resources like
ores and petroleum. Their economies have benefited
from the surge in international prices for commodities and the emergence of growing middle classes.
Moroccan interest in Africa is also driven by the necessity to gather political support among sub-Saharan
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African countries for Morocco’s claims to the Western
Sahara territory.
Morocco leverages its political connections with
a variety of Western African rulers to facilitate business opportunities for its private investors and stateowned commercial institutions. Though Morocco has
not been a member of the African Union since 1984, its
relations with sub-Saharan countries and involvement
in the continent’s security and development matters
have never ceased. Morocco has long-standing and
excellent relations with a number of West African
countries such as Gabon, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire.
Successive Moroccan Monarchs have persisted in efforts to maintain and establish new co-operative and
productive relationships. Furthermore, unlike European and, in general, Western countries, Morocco
benefits along with Western African countries from
not carrying any colonial baggage. On the contrary,
against the background of Morocco’s own struggles
for full political sovereignty from the French during
the 1950s, Morocco has managed to gain a reputation
among Western African political leaders as a trusted
ally, proactive in addressing African development
and security challenges.
Morocco’s current engagement in West Africa is
multifaceted; it focuses on security cooperation, economic development, strengthening cultural ties, and
capacity building. Moroccan authorities consider a
more comprehensive approach will be necessary; one
that embraces a sustained, and long-term investment
in the region’s security and economic and human
development.
Seen from Morocco, this comprehensive strategy
entails the exchange of experiences and expertise in
institutional capacity building in a variety of key
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sectors that are of importance to the socio-economic
development of West African societies. What characterizes the current strategy is the significant involvement of the Moroccan private sector. This involvement is unlike previous cooperation and engagement
efforts that were limited to ministries and publicly
owned institutions.
Security assistance forms an essential component
of Morocco’s pivot to West African countries. Without security and stability in these African countries,
Morocco cannot achieve its economic and commercial
objectives, since its own security is directly affected.
Moroccan officials consider these regions to be Morocco’s hinterland, given their geographical proximity
and strong commercial and cultural ties, but also because some of the security menaces are cross–border
in nature, including the trafficking of drugs, weapons,
and people.
This monograph focuses on the geopolitical and
economic drivers for the renewed Morrocan interest in West Africa. It also examines how Morocco is
conducting its foreign and security policy in a variety
of Western African countries. It highlights Morocco’s
contribution to counterextremism in the West Africa and Sahel regions by training African Mosques’
imams and preachers. It concludes with recommendations on how Morocco could be supported by the U.S.
defense community in tackling some of the key security challenges that are facing these sub-regions of Africa for the mutual benefit of both countries. Given the
common interest between the United States and Morocco in preserving peace and stability in Morocco’s
surrounding region, Rabat’s growing assertiveness
in West Africa presents an opportunity, rather than
a challenge, for U.S. interests. Morocco’s geographic
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location, political stability, and deep and long-standing cultural ties with sub-Saharan states provide a
potential bridgehead for U.S. efforts to promote its security objectives in Africa. At a time of severe defense
budget constraints, bilateral cooperation with reliable
and moderate regional partners can provide an effective multiplier and augment the U.S. reach into otherwise challenging regions.
A History of Strong Ties with West Africa.
Morocco’s bilateral relations with Western African
countries are not of recent origin. These relations date
back centuries to the time of different ruling dynasties
that governed Morocco, such as the Almoravids and
Almohads, as well as the current Alawi dynasty that
has ruled since 1666. These previous rulers traded with
sub-Saharan African countries and maintained close
social and religious links. Relations continued despite
challenges posed by a variety of political events, including the French protectorate and later decolonization debates.
After independence from the French and Spanish
colonial rule in 1956, Morocco continued its relations
with African countries. Moroccan engagement initially was driven by a desire to help colonized countries to achieve their independence through providing support to liberation movements and supporting
their cause in international circles. Morocco was a
key founding member of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU, now called the African Union [AU]), an
organization that initially was established to support
African territories and peoples to gain their freedom
and independence.1
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In the 1970s, cultivating the support of sub-Saharan African countries for Morocco’s claims on Western
Sahara became an important factor, one that continues
to drive Moroccan foreign policy until today. Moroccan diplomacy became very active in attempts to deny
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (RASD) any
new recognition, and pursue African countries that
had recognized RASD to withdraw their recognition.
The effectiveness of Morocco’s African foreign policy
was evident from the failure of the Nineteenth Annual
Summit of the OAU in August 1982 in Tripoli, Libya,
to achieve its two-thirds quorum, after a large number
of African countries supporting Morocco boycotted
the summit in protest at the admission of RASD as
a member of the organization.2 The later acceptance
of RASD as a member of the OAU, in turn, led Morocco to withdraw its membership in this pan-African
organization, a situation which persists today.3
The unresolved Western Sahara issue continues to
dominate Morocco’s foreign policy towards African
countries and the AU. In June 2014, the appointment
of former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano
by the AU as a special envoy for Western Sahara revived Morocco’s tensions with the organization, but
also highlighted how pervasive this territorial dispute
still is in Morocco’s relations with African countries.
Morocco objected to this appointment or any specific
AU role, stressing that handling of this issue remains
the exclusive domain of the United Nations (UN)
Security Council and the Secretary-General.4
However, the withdrawal of Morocco from the
AU in 1984 did not interrupt Morocco’s bilateral relations with many African countries and engagement
with the continent’s development and security issues.
Morocco has participated in many conferences and
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meetings concerning the African continent at UN, European Union (EU), and African levels. For example,
Morocco played an active role in initiating a dialogue
between African countries and the EU on migration
and development in 2006, known as the Rabat Process. The main objective of this initiative was to bring
together countries of origin, transit, and destination in
Europe to discuss the migration phenomenon not only
from a strictly security angle, but also from a development perspective.5 Morocco initiated or joined other
pan-African organizations to promote regional cooperation on a variety of issues, such as the Ministerial
Conference on Fisheries Cooperation among African
States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean that has its secretariat based in the Moroccan capital, Rabat; and the
Community of Sahel-Sahara states (CEN-SAD) that
Morocco joined in February 2001.6
Despite Morocco’s limited financial resources and
position as a major recipient of international aid for
the past 30 years, the country has continued to provide humanitarian and technical assistance to African
countries in order to maintain its influence and signal
its solidarity and commitment to the African continent’s causes. Over recent decades, Morocco has set
up military hospitals and sent food and medical aid
on a variety of occasions when Western African countries suffered from conflicts or natural disasters. The
most recent humanitarian initiative was the setting
up of a surgical field military hospital by the Moroccan armed forces in the Malian capital of Bamako, in
September 2013,7 and in Guinea-Conakry in February
2014.8 Morocco has also supported the development
of a variety of key sectors in some West African countries by sharing its knowledge and expertise. It granted scholarships to hundreds of students and provided
training to cadres from these countries.
6

On the bilateral level, Morocco has particularly
close relations with a number of West African leaders. For instance, Congo is one of its closest allies in
Africa. The late King Hassan II of Morocco and the
late Gabonese President Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba
forged a cordial relationship which translated into
closer ties between their two countries. The Gabonese
president was one of the key supporters of Morocco’s
sovereignty claim over Western Sahara. Both leaders
jointly staged diplomatic interventions to end crises
among African countries. The close relations between
the two leaders continue under their successors, King
Mohammed VI, and President Ali Bongo Ondimba.
Equally, Morocco’s relations with Equatorial Guinea
have been continuously friendly since the 1970s.
Changing Opportunities in View of West Africa’s
Economic Growth.
The past decade has witnessed a remarkable socioeconomic development trajectory in the economies of
Sub-Saharan Africa. These economic achievements
and their potential have gradually changed the perception of the region among the Moroccan political and
business elite. Despite glaring differences in economic
structures, rates of economic growth, and political
stability across sub-Saharan countries, the region as
a whole has realistic future economic potential. Since
2003, Sub-Saharan Africa has had average annual
growth of 5 percent. This is a significant achievement
particularly at a time when many developed economies are struggling to grow. According to International Monetary Fund, some Western African countries are
expected to grow at 6 percent per annum.9 These are
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic
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of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
Africa’s economic progress has been driven mainly by
the increase of international prices for commodities,
the expansion of middle class population, and urbanization. It is also these three trends that will continue
to make sub-Saharan Africa one of the fastest growing
regional economies over the coming decades.
Economic growth, particularly the last 15 years, has
benefited from the surge in global oil and commodities
prices in major oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria. Several West African countries are resource-abundant, such as Gabon, Republic of Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone. West
Africa’s natural resources are not limited to hydrocarbons, but also include other minerals such as iron ore,
precious metals, and agricultural commodities. However, sub-Saharan Africa’s economic progress has
also been derived from other diverse sources such as
tourism and manufacturing. Demographic trends and
urbanization have also contributed to growth. Africa’s
population is rising rapidly at a time when population
growth is slowing in other global regions. With a population of 924.7 million in 2014, Sub-Saharan Africa is
the world’s second most populous region after Asia.
The population is expected to more than double by
2050 to reach about two billion. This high growth rate
is driven largely by high fertility rates, on average 5.2
children per woman (compared to a world average of
2.5). Sub-Saharan Africa is also by far the most rapidly
urbanizing continent. In 2014, 37 percent of the population (345.6 million people) lived in urban areas. By
2050, about 1.1 billion will be living in cities. By 2035,
about half of the population will be urban.10
Domestic demand has constituted an important
part of this growth story. Africa’s middle class—
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including North Africa—has expanded greatly over
the last 2 decades. According to a report by the African Development Bank, the middle class doubled in
size between 1990 and 2010, from 157 million to 326
million.11 This effectively includes individuals earning between US$2 to US$20 per day. The middle class
is projected to continue to grow and reach 1.1 billion
(42 percent of the population) by 2060. The more affluent lifestyle associated with the middle class has contributed to increased domestic consumption in many
African countries.
Another driver pushing Moroccan political and
economic elites to diversify the country’s economic
relations by strengthening ties with faster-growing
countries is uncertainty over the duration of the economic crisis in Europe, and its potential ramifications
for Morocco and other traditional North African trade
partners in Europe. The negative impact of the economic crisis in the EU on the Moroccan economy, whose
main trading partner is the EU, has already been felt in
a drop in foreign investment, the return of Moroccan
immigrants, and a fall in some exports.
Morocco’s external economic ambitions are also a
response to the realization by African leaders of the
need for external assistance and foreign investment in
order to achieve the economic development required
to meet the rising expectations of their people. Western African governments are keen to modernize their
economies by strengthening their competitiveness and
economic diversity in order to make those economies
more resilient to commodities price fluctuations. Moroccan political and business elites see in this expansion of public investment in West Africa, and in the rise
of the middle class, a variety of business opportunities, which has encouraged them to set up production
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plants and distribution channels for consumer goods
as well as engaging in the building of infrastructure
projects. This is discernible in investment projects announced by Moroccan public and private entities over
the last 5 years. A good example of this trend is the
investment of the Moroccan property developer, Addoha, in building affordable housing in Mali, CongoBrazzaville, and Cameroon; as well as cement factories
in Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Conakry, Gabon,
Burkina Faso, and Congo-Brazzaville.12
What characterizes the current Moroccan foreign
policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, compared to previous engagements, is that it is a coherent and wellorchestrated strategy with a strong backing from the
Moroccan palace. The dossier of rapprochement with
African countries is handled at Palace level; it is in the
hands of the King and his entourage. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and other ministries play a minor
role in developing this emerging relationship. Their
role is limited to executing what is assigned to them
and implementing the previously agreed cooperation
agreement.
Morocco’s current African strategy is proactive.
Moroccan institutions have analyzed market potentials and gone on to pursue them. This is different
from what characterized Morocco’s relations with Africa under the late King Hassan II, which were mainly
conducted on an ad hoc basis with the single goal of
securing African states’ diplomatic support on the
Western Sahara issue. However, this does not argue
that the current rapprochement does not achieve such
diplomatic influence. It certainly does, but also in full
alignment with other socio-economic and security
objectives.
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The formulation of Morocco’s grand strategy towards Africa has been based, to a large extent, on the
investment experience of the country’s financial institutions in French-speaking Africa. Morocco’s three
leading banks—Attijariwafa Bank, Banque marocaine
du commerce extérieur (BMCE), and Banque Centrale
Populaire (BCP)—have boosted their retail banking
presence in several sub-Saharan African countries
since 2005. Moroccan lenders are now occupying leading positions within the African banking landscape in
terms of assets and regional network coverage.13 Attijariwafa bank has 414 branches in 11 West and Central
African countries.14 BCP, after taking control of the
Ivorian Banque Atlantique in 2012 to add to its earlier
acquisitions of Banque populaire Morocco-Centrafricaine and Banque populaire Marocco-Guineenne, has a
presence in seven countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. BMCE Bank with its 72.6
percent stake in Bank of Africa has an extensive geographical coverage. In 2014, BMCE was present in 16
countries with a total of 461 branches.15 BMCE is the
only Moroccan bank that operates not only in Frenchspeaking Africa, but also has a presence and a plan
to expand into English-speaking African countries in
Central and East Africa.
The remarkable experience of Moroccan banks’
expansion in Western and Central African countries
has inspired other Moroccan companies to seek opportunities in a variety of sectors. The systematic
insights and contacts that such institutions have aggregated from these African countries have contributed to the formulation of the new Moroccan foreign
policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. The dominance of
economic elements in Morocco’s ongoing engagement
with sub-Saharan African countries, and the nature
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of investment and economic partnership agreements
inked so far, are an indication of the contribution of
Morocco’s early banking investments. Those charged
with the formulation of Moroccan policy and strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa have benefited from
detailed insights on business opportunities in these
African countries.
What is different now? Morocco has aggregated
immense expertise in a variety of fields that are needed for the development of African countries. Morocco,
during the 15 years rule of King Mohammed VI, has
launched major economic, social, and security projects that have given Moroccan private and public
institutions significant experience and relevant skill
sets. Moroccan companies in variety of sectors—from
banking, agriculture, real estate, and pharmaceutical to physical infrastructure development—have
accumulated extensive industry knowledge, experience, and financial wealth that allow them to expand
internationally.
A few leading Moroccan conglomerates, such as
Addoha, Cooper Pharma Maroc, and the National Office of Electricity, have made accessing sub-Saharan
African markets an important part of their internationalization strategies. Several of these companies
have inked contracts to build overseas manufacturing
units during the last 3 years.
The expansion of the Moroccan state-owned Office Chérien des Phosphates (OCP) into Africa exemplifies Morocco’s new economic strategy towards Africa.
With its rising population and agriculture production
potential, sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly becoming an important growth market for the OCP, a world
leading phosphate fertilizers producer.
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OCP has set up a new production unit in Jarf Lasfar, a Moroccan industrial park and port south of
Casablanca that exports its entire production to SubSaharan Africa. OCP has even developed specific fertilizing products that are suitable for West Africa soils,
such as the Teractive fertilizer that is designed for
local crops, including: cotton, cocoa, and corn. Ivory
Coast is by far the largest cocoa producer in the world
followed by Ghana. Adding Nigeria and Cameroon,
the combined share is around 70 percent of global
production.16
In March 2014, OCP and Gabon’s state-owned
mining company, Société Équatoriale des Mines,
signed a partnership agreement to develop a fertilizer
manufacturing industry involving both countries and
dedicated entirely to meeting demand in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The logic behind this joint venture is to exploit
synergies between the phosphate and natural gas resources of both countries. The partnership agreement
stipulates building an ammonia plant in Gabon that
uses natural gas feedstock, and a phosphate fertilizers production unit. Morocco undertakes to build two
phosphoric acid facilities and a unit to produce phosphate-based fertilizers in Morocco. OCP’s partnership
with Gabon is driven both by the desire to tap into
new growing markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, and by
a need to access natural gas resources that constitute
an important input to produce fertilizers. This project
symbolizes the kind of partnerships by Moroccan private and public institutions that are willing to pursue
the creation of wealth and achieve economic development across the continent.
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Gateway to Africa.
The strengthening of the presence of Moroccan
companies in sub-Saharan Africa is one pillar of Morocco’s new economic strategy. A second pillar focuses
on positioning Morocco as both a hub and foothold for
international companies with an interest in expanding
across the African continent. BMCE bank was the first
Moroccan bank to see an opportunity in becoming a
hub for Africa by capitalizing on Morocco’s linguistic,
political, and cultural connections with a number of
African countries. In 2007, BMCE set up an investment
bank in London (MediCapital Bank, since 2010 renamed BMCE Bank International Plc), with a business
mandate to harness international partnership opportunities with interest in sub-Sahara Africa, particularly
French-speaking Africa.17 Leveraging its expertise and
experience in working in sub-Saharan Africa, BMCE
has hoped to encourage international investment into
Africa and Morocco itself. Though BMCE’s experience
in London was not a great success, the idea of Morocco serving as a gateway for international investors
to expand into to North and West-African countries
was adopted by Moroccan decisionmakers, and the
launch of the Casablanca Financial City project in 2010
reflects this adoption.
Casablanca Financial City is meant to become a financial hub for the French-speaking African market.
Many of the major multinational manufacturers that
have set up production units in Morocco have been
attracted by the possibilities of accessing African markets. The most recent example is the decision by the
French-based automaker, PSA Peugeot Citroën, to
build a manufacturing facility in Morocco, with plans
to produce 200,000 cars and 200,000 motorcycles annually. One of the main factors driving this investment,
14

in addition to the availability of affordable skilled
labor, is the potential for accessing sub-Saharan and
Middle-Eastern markets18 by taking advantage of
Morocco’s network of free trade agreements and
excellent political ties across these two regions.
Solidarity and Crisis Management Help.
Morocco’s reconnection with West Africa is not
limited only to business contracts and official visits;
many of Morocco’s economic initiatives over the last
few years have been launched with an important social dimension in mind. Over the last 3 years in particular, Morocco has adopted several initiatives to show
solidarity with Western African countries.
In 2014, Morocco launched its first program to legalize immigrants from a variety of African countries
who had lived in Morocco for years, waiting for an
opportunity to immigrate to Europe. The change of official attitude in Morocco towards illegal immigrants
is not driven by the need for workers, as used to be the
case in many European countries up until a few years
ago. Morocco is a country with a young population
that is larger than the current economy can provide
with adequate job opportunities. Nor is Morocco prosperous enough to provide thousands of immigrants
with basic socio-economic services such as education
and heath care.
Morocco’s tolerance of African illegal immigration
has two other explanations. First, this is an attempt by
the Moroccan government to refute media reporting
alleging racist and inhumane treatment of illegal African immigrants. Second, this tolerance is an attempt to
show Morocco's solidarity with other African peoples:
this is a move to win the hearts and minds of Africans
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and demonstrate a difference from the approaches
adopted by many European countries.
Morocco showed its solidarity again during the
2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, which is considered to be one of the most severe, prolonged, and
complicated outbreaks to have affected the region in
decades, with 22,859 infection cases and a total of 9,162
deaths, according to statistics published in February
2015.19 When most international air carriers were suspending their flights to Western African airports over
fear of virus contagion, Morocco’s air carrier, Royal
Air Maroc (RAM), continued flights, including to the
areas most affected by the Ebola epidemic; Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea.20 The continuation of RAM
flights in and out of Western African airports allowed
international medical aid workers to arrive at the affected areas, and Western African citizens to stay connected with the world. Maintaining scheduled flights
was also a clear message of solidarity with Western
African countries.
This gesture was well-received by the political
leadership in Western African capitals. During the
High-Level International Conference on Ebola organized in Brussels in March 2015, Alpha Conde, the president of Guinea, praised Morocco’s stance for keeping
its borders open, allowing the free movement of people.21 These initiatives are designed in senior Moroccan
political circles to boost the country’s status as a reliable ally and partner for African countries. The strategy
appears to be bearing fruit. The Moroccan monarch
seems to have won the sympathy of West African societies and leaders, as indicated by the number of popular receptions given to the King during his June tour
of Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gabon.22
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Security Cooperation.
Morocco has now, more than ever, vested interests in seeing Sub-Saharan Africa, and West Africa in
particular, politically stable, secure, and prosperous.
Increased Moroccan economic presence in West African economies will posit an important Moroccan role
in the security of the region. In the event of political
instability and chaos, it is Morocco which would suffer most directly, being West Africa’s main gateway
for illegal trafficking into Europe. Having fought a
long-standing, and so far relatively successful, battle
against both Arab Spring-style popular protest movements on the one hand, and radical Islamist terrorism on the other, Morocco has a strong incentive to
prevent the creation of political flash points near its
hard to control southern borders, or of safe havens
for international terrorist cells, whether religious in
nature or not. Furthermore, substantial Moroccan investment projects include manufacturing plants and
infrastructure projects that require stability to continue production. Prolonged disruptions of business operations due to any political or social instability would
adversely affect these Moroccan investments. Without security and stability in these African countries,
Morocco cannot achieve its economic and commercial
objectives.
For example, the political and military crisis in
Cote d’Ivoire that began in 2002, and particularly
the serious post-election crisis that followed the announcement of the results of the second round of the
presidential election on November 28, 2010, resulted
in large-scale economic disruption that adversely
impacted Moroccan investment and diaspora remittances.23 Attijariwafa Bank, through its subsidiary the
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Ivorian Society Bank, incurred a drop in its revenues,
as it had to close down its operations for months during the height of the 2011 crisis.24 Banque populaire
Morocco-Centrafricaine is another Moroccan-owned
financial institution that has been adversely affected
by deep political, security, and economic crises in Central African Republic.25 The economic disruptions as a
result of this conflict negatively impacted the bank’s
performance.26 For the Moroccan ruling circle, this is
also a matter that affects personal wealth since many
of its members hold shares, board memberships, and
commercial roles in these companies.
Although the worst political and criminal violence
across the region appears to be over, the security situation across West Africa, as is the case in several other
sub-Saharan regions, remains particularly volatile.
Decades of political turmoil and armed conflicts have
left the region’s state authorities weak and unable to
control nonstate armed groups or the illicit traffic of
drugs and people in their respective territories, or to
set up an effective regional security force.27 Since 2011,
the flood of weapons from the Libyan conflict has also
added to insecurity throughout West Africa, as rebels,
terrorist groups, and criminal organizations benefit
from the movement of arms and fighters. The rapid
economic growth experienced in some countries has
not benefited all citizens and provinces evenly. This
fragile security and political situations has undoubtedly been a serious challenge to West African governments and their international partners.
Morocco’s concerns about security challenges in
West Africa preceded its renewed economic interest
in this African sub-region. Given their international
nature, the rise of terrorism, piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, and illicit traffick-
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ing of drugs and humans in West African countries
have always been perceived as direct threats to Morocco. Given Morocco’s geographic location, criminal
groups based in West Africa are tempted to use Moroccan territory as a transit point to smuggle migrants,
cocaine, or other narcotics to Europe. In fact, Morocco
has become a major transit hub for the trafficking of
migrants. Also, over the last decade, there have been
many stories in the Moroccan press about seizures
of cocaine proceeding from West African countries
through Moroccan ports and airports.28 In particular,
the nexus between organized crime and terrorism
remains the most alarming to Moroccan security authorities. There is concern about the use of financial
proceeds from drug and human trafficking by terrorist organizations within Morocco or at its borders to
carry out systematic attacks within the country.
Against this background, it is not surprising that
Morocco has shown interest in playing an important
role in helping West Africa and Sahel countries tackle
their significant and complex security challenges over
the last decade, and particularly after the events of the
Arab Spring in 2011. Moroccan diplomacy has been
continuously active and supportive of a variety of
initiatives and debates in African, European, and UN
forums, calling for structural solutions to West Africa and Sahel security problems. For instance, King
Mohammed VI, in a speech addressed to the 69th
session of the UN General Assembly, called on developed countries to change their attitude towards African development matters and treat African countries
with fairness and objectivity. He asserted that “Africa
does not need humanitarian aid as much as it needs
mutually beneficial partnerships.”29
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Moroccan officials argue that their engagement in
support of peace and stability in West Africa is not
a novelty. Morocco’s armed forces have participated
in numerous peace missions in Africa since independence in 1956, and have provided military assistance
to West African nations either under the umbrella of
the UN or bilaterally to its allies since the 1960s. For
instance, Morocco contributed to the stability of Zaire
(now the DRC) in 1977 by sending a large Moroccan
military contingent. The mission of Moroccan troops,
leading a pan-African force, was to assist President
Mobutu Sese Seko to restore control and stability in
Shaba, a mineral-rich province, after the withdrawal
of a Franco-Belgian force which had repulsed attacks
by an Angola-based rebel group.30 Another Western
African country that benefited from Moroccan military assistance is Equatorial Guinea. In September
1979, Morocco sent 100 military officers to the then
newly appointed President Teodoro Obiang Nguema,
after a military coup that deposed Francisco Macias
Nguema on August 3, 1979.31 Morocco maintained its
security assistance to Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who
still rules Equatorial Guinea today. Morocco has also
contributed to UN peacekeeping forces in several
West African countries including the Congo in 1960,
the DRC in 1999 and in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004.32 Furthermore, Morocco has offered hundreds of military
officers from West African armies opportunities to
receive education and training in Moroccan military
academies alongside Moroccan officers.
Since 2012, Morocco has assumed a more assertive
role in its foreign policy towards the West Africa and
Sahel regions. The changes and challenges brought by
the Arab spring in North Africa have created a new
geopolitical environment for Morocco. The killing of
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Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 gave Morocco an opportunity to play an active role in one of
the already existing pan-African economic and security cooperation organizations and initiatives. During
his rule, Qadhafi had had an assertive foreign policy
in the Sahel and other parts of Africa, using Libya’s
financial resources and his unity ideology to gain
influence.33 Morocco’s foreign policy attitude at that
time was to avoid any competition and potential confrontation with Qadhafi for a leadership role in these
African regions, and to opt instead for a more subtle
approach working on a bilateral basis with West
African countries.
Another significant change in North Africa’s geopolitical environment is the perception in Rabat and in
Western capitals of Algeria’s shift away from playing
an active role in the Sahel. The rapid deterioration of
security environment along almost all Algerian borders in addition to the country’s acute internal social
problems have forced the Algerian leadership to take
a defensive position, and show little interest in playing a major role in the security of the region. Algeria’s refusal to participate in any Western-led military
intervention in northern Mali, and its preference for
a diplomatic solution has been widely interpreted as
a withdrawal from the Sahel.34 It is beyond the scope
of this monograph to discuss in details the motives of
Algerian stances on the Libya and Mali security situations, but this is interpreted as a tactical retreat, allowing Algerian military strategists to adapt to the
new complex geopolitical scene next to their borders.
Algerian political and military elites have resisted being drawn into any exhausting war in the region with
little prospect of resolution but have, similarly to Morocco, been affected negatively by the trafficking of
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weapons, people, and radical ideas pushing through
its southern and eastern frontiers.
In this context, the Moroccan authorities saw an opportunity to expand Morocco’s influence and assume
a hegemonic role in the region. Morocco organized a
series of conferences and meetings to discuss ways
and means to fight transnational organized crime and
terrorism, including illicit drug trafficking, which remains a major threat to peace and security in the Sahel
and West Africa regions. In November 2013, Morocco
held the Second Regional Ministerial Conference on
border security between Sahel and Maghreb States
that brought senior officials from the region together
with representatives from the United States, France,
and EU. Morocco offered to host the headquarters of a
regional border security management training center
that was agreed at the conference.35
The establishment of this center was a response to
an acute security problem that affects many countries
in the region. Many governments are unable or unwilling to exercise full control of their own borders, or
coordinate with their neighboring countries on joint
surveillance operations, a weakness that is exploited
by terrorists and traffickers. Terrorists in particular
find it straightforward to carry out attack operations
and then flee to another country, seeking sanctuary.
Once established, the center will provide training to
officers with responsibility for border security management in the states of the region, as well as allow
for sharing of expertise and best practices—in terms
of institutions, policies, laws and procedures—from
other leading international partners.
Since early-2012, Morocco has been leading efforts
to revive and restructure the Community of SahelSaharan States (CEN-SAD), an intergovernmental
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organization with 28 members that was closely associated with the late Libyan ruler, Qadhafi.36 Morocco
advocates the need for strengthening CEN-SAD in
order to tackle the region’s precarious security situation. Since a January 2012 meeting in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, Morocco has hosted several meetings to
discuss the issue of reorganizing the organization to
tackle security challenges through a comprehensive
approach placed at the center of each meeting agenda.
The drive to reshape the organization and allow it to
build a collective security mechanism is a response to
the failures and inability of Sahel and West African
countries to coordinate responses to recent crises in
Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Central African Republic; as
well as their inability to enhance border controls and
fight terrorism.
Morocco appears to allocate great importance to
these meetings and efforts, as is evident from the involvement and support of the highest decisionmaking figures within Morocco. For instance, during the
October 2013 CEN-SAD meeting in Rabat, Moroccan
Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar highlighted
the importance of amending the policies of the SaheloSaharian Investment and Commerce Bank, a subsidiary organ of CEN-SAD, to allow it to play a bigger
role in the socio-economic development of its member
countries.37
Morocco’s hegemonic ambitions in the Maghreb
and Sahel regions also remain a driving force behind
its active role in strengthening and playing a leading
role in CEN-SAD. A strong organization with efficient
political and economic organs, and clear security objectives will undermine Algeria’s main security initiative
in the Sahel, Comité d’état-major opérationnel conjoint
(CEMOC). CEMOC was launched by Algeria in April
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2010 with the aim of coordinating counterterrorism
efforts and conducting joint patrols and cross-border
operations between Algerian, Nigerien, Mauritanian,
and Malian forces.38
Counterterrorism through the Training
of Religious Preachers.
Perhaps the most visible indication of Morocco’s
distinctive influence in West Africa and Sahel regions
is its contribution to counterterrorism, primarily
through counterextremism, by training religious personnel in the Moroccan experience of reforming religious affairs. In recent years, there has been growing
interest in receiving Moroccan assistance in this field
from West Africa and Sahel countries. During King
Mohammed VI’s visit to Mali in September 2013, the
Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs agreed to provide training to 500 Malian imams.
The purpose of this 2-year training is to ensure that religious leaders preach moderate messages to the public, and that they are prepared to engage in theological
debates to challenge extremist views.39
Other countries, such as Guinea-Conakry, Cote
d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Libya have approached
Morocco for the same training for their Imams and
preachers in order to benefit from Moroccan experience in tackling extremism through dialogue and
communication. To respond to the surge in demand
for training of religious personnel, Morocco established the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of
Imams, Morchidines, and Morchidates (female Islamic preachers) in March 2015, with capacity to train up
to 1,000 candidates.40 A few months later, in July 2015,
the Moroccan King inaugurated another pan-African
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religious institution, the Mohammed VI Foundation
for African Ulama (Muslim religious scholars).41 According to Royal Decree (Dahir) No.1.15.75, from its
headquarters in Rabat, the foundation aims to coordinate African Muslim scholars’ efforts to generate and
disseminate ideas of tolerance on the basis of Islamic
values, revitalize the common Islamic cultural heritage, undertake scientific research in Islamic studies,
and organize events.42 Though the foundation’s competencies do not include issuance of fatwas, this initiative is likely to further strengthen Moroccan influence
across Muslim communities in Africa.
Morocco’s successful reform of religious affairs
initiated after the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks
has positioned the country as a leading example in the
Muslim world by subtly but determinedly counteracting religious radicalism and terrorism. The reshaping
of religious institutions and affairs has constituted an
important part of the Moroccan government strategy
to combat terrorism.43 It is arguably not only one of
the most comprehensive reform packages of religion
and religious institutions in Morocco, but also in the
Muslim world.
Some of the principal aspects of this reform
include:
•	
Training and educating religious personnel, including not only those who lead worship (known as Imams), but also male and
female preachers (known as Murchidin and
Murchidat).
•	
The launch of television and radio stations
whose sole purpose is to counterbalance the
influence of hardline preachers, and the influence of religious satellite channels from the
Middle East and Iran that spread radical Islam
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or Shi’ism. The ultimate aim is to achieve a high
level of religious homogeneity among Moroccan Muslims and avoid the emergence of any
sectarian divide in the country.
•	The stipulation that only qualified scholars approved by the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs are allowed to issue
fatwas (religious legal opinion), thus preventing the involvement of unauthorized scholars
and radical preachers. The only institutions authorized to issue fatwas are the High Council of
Ulama (religious scholars) and Regional Ulama
Councils.44
A further important factor that has led to official
requests for Morocco’s assistance in religious affairs
from Western African governments is backing from
important religious groups in societies that have maintained strong religious ties with Morocco. Moroccan
Sufi orders have many followers in a range of African
countries, and maintain strong ties with West African
Sufi orders that date back centuries.
In being perceived to be moderate and flexible in
terms of the diversity and nature of sources available to
the Ulama to practice Ijtihad—reinterpreting the principles of Islam to provide legal answers to contemporary issues facing Muslims and Muslim societies—the
Maliki madhab (Islamic legal school) that is officially
adopted by Morocco aims to provide answers to contemporary issues that have not been dealt with in the
fundamental texts (the Qura’an and Sunnah—Prophet
Muhammad’s known sayings and deeds). The Maliki
madhab is praised for consulting more sources than
the other remaining three Sunni Schools. More importantly, it accommodates local traditions and reconciles
them with the teachings of fundamental texts.
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Cooperation with Regional and
International Partners.
Despite willingness to contribute to the promotion
of peace and security in the region, Moroccan officials
in Rabat are aware of their own limitations. There is
a recognition that the security needs of West Africa
are multiple and complex, and beyond the technical,
human, and financial capabilities of Morocco acting
alone. The proliferation of militant groups in the region, many of which have ties to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) or other international terrorist organizations, remains a main challenge facing the region. It is
one which requires well-trained and equipped armed
forces, not only in one country but across the Sahel
and West Africa region, given the transborder nature
of the threats. For example, Boko Haram is a major
threat for all of western Africa with proven links to
AQIM and other terrorist organizations.45 The existing
military capabilities, with minimal communication
networks and limited manpower resources, are not
suited for effective surveillance and control over vast
terrains on the edge of the Sahara desert. Furthermore,
many West African militaries are not structured and
trained to face the challenges with which their countries have been presented in recent years.
Morocco recognizes that it is effectively impossible
for individual countries to tackle today’s international
security challenges on their own, and therefore acknowledges the necessity of working with regional
and international partners to be able to deal systematically with cross-border security challenges. Cooperation will allow also pooling of knowledge, expertise
and resources to tackle some of these security menaces that are destabilizing West Africa.
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The reform of armed forces in West African countries will entail a considerable training effort in order
to enable these militaries to play a more effective role
in meeting current and future security challenges facing their own societies and states. As a result, security sector reform is becoming a priority policy area
in order to maintain stability and achieve economic
growth across the West Africa region. West Africa’s
armed forces and security agencies have been debilitated or deprived of opportunities to professionalize, including by decades of instability as a result of
frequent regime changes and coups, which have precipitated frequent rearranging of security policies and
institutions.
Morocco could play an important role with other
international partners in delivering military assistance to West African countries. Morocco can leverage
its linguistic access, and its understanding of military
cultures, its political ties, and growing economic presence to become a hub for international donors and
nongovernmental organizations that are interested in
professionalizing armed forces and providing security sector reform assistance to West African countries.
Strengthening the security sector requires understanding how local institutions function and building
relationships with key local stakeholders, including
civil society actors. With these factors in mind, Morocco is well-positioned with partnership and support
from leading international associates to provide tailored training and capacity building assistance that
meet the specific needs of each individual armed force
across the region.
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Conclusion.
Deepening the engagement with Sub-Saharan
Africa, particularly with West African countries, is
what distinguishes Morocco’s foreign policy under
the rule of the current King, Mohammed VI. West
African economies and markets are increasingly gaining importance in Morocco’s ambition to diversify
its export markets and seek new sources of growth
for its companies. Over the last decade, sub-Saharan
Africa, including West Africa, has emerged as one of
the world’s fastest growing regional economies. This
growth momentum looks set to be maintained in the
coming years.
Morocco is keen to leverage its linguistic, political, and cultural ties with West African societies and
leaders in order to seek new economic development
opportunities. This can be seen from the number of bilateral agreements signed during numerous visits by
the Moroccan monarch to African countries, and initiatives launched in Morocco over the last few years.
Though one could argue that there is nothing new
in signing training, commercial, and sectorial cooperation agreements between Morocco and sub-Saharan African countries (as there have been many such
agreements signed since the 1970s and 1980s), what
distinguishes Morocco’s current engagement in Western Africa is the substantial involvement of private
investors in a variety of sectors and countries across
the continent. The experience and expertise gained by
Morocco public and private sector investors over the
last 15 years in a variety of fields have positioned the
country as a model of socio-economic development
and a desired partner for many sub-Saharan countries.
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Morocco has a vital interest in preventing the deterioration of West Africa’s security. It is well understood in Moroccan political circles that harnessing economic growth opportunities in Western Africa cannot
be achieved without peace and security. Despite some
progress in political and economic stability over recent years, the security situation remains particularly
volatile, given the weak state of security institutions
and the existence of large number of armed groups
that are competing with some West African states for
control of resources.
An important Moroccan contribution to the security of West Africa and the Sahel is in the realm of
fighting religious extremism, through the sharing of
the country’s expertise and experience gained from
the implementation of multifaceted reform of religious affairs, particularly the training and education
of clerics. Morocco perceives the training of imams as
an approach to preventing and countering radicalization. Fostering moderate imams will contribute to the
resilience of individuals and communities against the
appeal of violent extremism.
But there is appetite in Rabat to play a greater role
in facilitating comprehensive solutions to West Africa
security problems in cooperation with African and Sahel countries as well as with other international allies.
To increase its influence, Morocco plays an increasingly active role in regional institutions, including CENSAD, particularly contributing to ongoing efforts to
revitalize the role of this pan-African organization’s
mission, and orient its mission towards cooperation
on tackling regional security problems.
Morocco’s renewed interest in contributing to the
security of the West Africa region, primarily through
capability-building, is opening new opportunities for
cooperation beyond the region to include other inter30

national partners with similar policy objectives. It also
suggests new opportunities for the United States and
Morocco to further strengthen their bilateral strategic
dialogue by collaborating on regional matters.
Implications and Recommendations.
Morocco’s new policy of engagement is an important factor in the evolving security and counterterrorism dynamic in the region. The emergence of a
relatively powerful new player in security provision
in Africa is a matter of immediate relevance to the U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM), to the U.S. Army more
broadly, and to the U.S. Department of State (DoS).
Following and understanding the developing regional power balance in West Africa, and the redrawing
of new alliances within the region, are vital not only
to fostering regional security, but also to an understanding of developments in the continent overall.
Morocco’s clear incentive to enhance its own
national security by acting as a regional security
provider offers substantial opportunities for cooperation. Several of the problems facing Morocco lie at
the root of security challenges confronting close U.S.
allies in Europe: resolution of those problems calls for
stronger cooperation at the state level, both in the subregion and internationally. Regional and international
threats emanating from West Africa and Sahel cannot
be tackled effectively without pursuing innovative
partnerships and better exploitation of synergies offered by different countries. Thus, with appropriate
support, Morocco’s niche capabilities can be exploited
to deliver professionalization programs for West African militaries, as well as other security sector reform
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initiatives aimed at reducing the incidence of uncontrolled migration, terrorism, trafficking in narcotics
and humans, and other cross-border challenges.
This potential for collaboration has already been
partially recognized, by initiatives which can now be
built on. In 2004, Morocco was designated a “major
non-NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] U.S.
ally” by President George W. Bush, as a response to
the country’s support and cooperation in the war on
terror.46 In practical terms, this status has allowed
the Moroccan security community to benefit from
U.S. military assistance and intelligence cooperation. Morocco hosts a yearly joint military exercise,
Africa Lion, the largest U.S. exercise on the African
continent, intended to enhance interoperability and
mutual understanding. In addition, several hundred
Moroccan officers have benefited from International
Military Education and Training, a program funded
by the DoS to enable foreign officers to attend military
education at U.S. establishments.47
Further vectors for cooperation are provided by
Morocco’s relatively close relationship with NATO,
as a founding member of Mediterranean Dialogue in
1994. Morocco’s NATO partnership framework was
renewed in 2013, with a focus on counterterrorism
and interoperability.48 This is augmented by Moroccan participation in NATO operations, and ongoing
exercises and cooperation between NATO and Moroccan naval forces including U.S. Navy vessels.49
With its unique mix of geographical location, cultural, religious and linguistic ties, Morocco could become the international partner of choice for the U.S.
defense and development communities to facilitate
and jointly provide security assistance programs.
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Morocco can capitalize on the same assets that have
been used for its investment strategies towards Africa
in order to tailor and deliver effective security assistance and security sector reforms. Moroccan military
personnel and institutions are familiar with West African military officers and cultures. Morocco has sent
several military contingents and provided military
education and training to hundreds of West African
officers. Morocco’s political stability and the professionalism of its military institutions are advantageous,
both for cooperation with U.S. counterparts and for
effective delivery of security assistance to recipient
countries.
Morocco’s long-term and continuing political
stability is a further significant factor that should encourage the United States to strengthen its security
cooperation and collaboration with Rabat. In a region that has experienced sustained political turmoil,
Morocco today remains one of the few continuously
stable countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
Instead, the country’s leadership has been adept in negotiating and resolving political and economic challenges. If this trend continues, it removes a number
of the risks and challenges inherent in closer security
relationships with Middle Eastern and North African
states.
Morocco’s ongoing Western Sahara territorial dispute in particular does not pose a challenge to the stability of the country, or to its external relationships.
Morocco continues to favor a political settlement of
the dispute, and eschews use of military force. As a
result, the existence of the dispute has not prevented
Morocco from developing close security cooperation
with a variety of European countries, including Spain,
the former colonial power in Western Sahara.
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The Morocco-based training center for border security in Sahel and West Africa should be supported and enhanced. The U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) should not limit its support to establishing the
training center for border security officers from West
Africa and Sahel agreed in Rabat in November 2013,
but it also should encourage the extension of these
activities. The Center could provide a wide range of
other training courses that can contribute to building
the military and security capabilities of West African
armed forces. Several counterterrorism training programs offered by AFRICOM through the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership could be delivered
through this center, and thus benefit from funding assistance offered by the Counterterrorism Partnerships
Fund. This regional training center could serve as a
specialized think tank to support needs assessments
undertaken by member countries, as well as providing strategic advice and guidance.
Morocco’s extension of its counter-radicalism
strategy to sub-Saharan Africa should be supported
and encouraged. The U.S. defense community and
DoS should support at arm’s length Morocco’s efforts
to counter violent extremism through the training of
religious personnel and institutionalising of religious
affairs in West Africa and Sahel countries. The Moroccan experience of religious affairs reform, with
proven success in counter-radicalization, should be
studied closely. Lessons learned could be of help in
providing similar solutions in other areas where the
United States is involved in stabilization and counterterrorism operations, as well as for counter-radicalization efforts domestically and within the United
States and its allies. In particular, there are substantial
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synergies between Morocco’s counterextremism experience and expertise, and U.S. Government strategic
communications initiatives across broad parts of the
Muslim world; these synergies should be leveraged
and exploited.
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